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Efficiency  wage theory suggests  that wages (and hence labor
markets)  may be unresponsive  to typical  macroeconomic  poli-
cies that seek to lower  real wages,  change  resource  allocation,
and reduce  open unemployment.  Under  this theory,  firms  will
react to macroeconomic  shocks  by altering  employment  (laying
workers  off), not wages.
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Conventional labor theory argues that wages are  groups in th" 'abor force and cannot be affected
determined by the interaction of labor supply and  by demand nianagement policies.  Workers
demand - the firm takes the market wage as an  offering services at a lower wage rate are unable
exogenous parameter.  Under conventional  to drive the wage down and to expand employ-
theory, policy analysis on wage rigidity has  ment.
emphasized distortions arising from exogenous
(union and government) intervention.  Thus, one  *  When reducing the level of production-
emphasis in adjustment lending has been deregu-  and to the extent that other firms' wages are
lation of labor markets.  perceived as given - the typical firm will resort
to laying off labor instead of reducing wages,
Efficiency wage models of unemployment  thereby introducing a significant wage inertia
try to explain persistent real wage rigidities when  and an overshooting of open unemployment.
unemployment persists.  Their central assump-  The finn's  profit-maximizing wage may exceed
tion is that higher real wages can impro' e labor  the opportunity cost of redundant labor, but
productivity.  A major implication of .iese  lower wages would entail a greater loss associ-
theories is that wages (and hence labor markets)  ated with the reduction of productivity and the
may be unresponsive to typical macroeconomic  "average quality" of workers than would be
policies that seek to lower real wages, change  gained from reducing per-worker costs.
resource allocation, and reduce open unemploy-
ment.  Under this theory, firms will react to  - Wages do not respond to clear the labor
macroeconomic shocks by cutting back on jobs,  market and are not responsive to macroeconomic
not wages.  policies and microeconomic deregulation.
The three central macroeconomic implica-  Riveros and Bouton conclude that applying
tions of efficiency wage theory are these:  the theory in developing countries requires
suitably defining labor costs and tackling the
a There is an equilibrium "natural" level of  problem of segmentation of the labor market
open unemployment, which differs among  (into formal and informal markets).
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Recently,  the design and effectiveness  of appropriated  labor market policies  in the context
of structural  adjustment  programs  in developing  countries  has received  a great deal  of attention. For
the most part, structural  adjustment  programs seek to permanently  change relative  prices thereby
shifting  resources  away from the production  of non-traded  towards traded goods.  Inter-industry
factor  mobility,  particularly  labor mobility,  is, therefore,  of paramount  importance  in achieving  this
supply  response.
Rigidity  in the wage  structure  has been  singled  out  as an important  factor  preventing  efficient
inter-industry  labor mobility, thereby  contributing  to the persistence  of high unemployment. The
segmentation  that characterizes  most developing  countries' labor markets, constrains  the supply
response  to adjustment  policies  especially  since  the limited  flexibility  of real wages in the  formal
sector  slows  the reallocation  of labor  and production,  and increases  the burden  of adjustment  on the
informal  sector. Since  the formal  sector is normally  the producer  of traded  goods in the economy,
wage rigidity  in this sector  is a crucial  impediment  to adequate  labor mobility  and hence  inhibits  the
supply  response  to macroeconomic  policies. From a political  economy  perspective,  the sluggish
supply  response  and inequitable  burden  borne by the informal  sector, which is typically  increased
by the presence  of high unemployment,  can  only weaken  the political  support  needed  for successful
structural  adjustment.
To date, policy  analysis  on wage  rigidity in the formal  sector has emphasized  the role of
distortions  arising  from  exogenous  (union  and  government)  intervention'.  As a result, it has - within
the context of macroeconomic  conditionality  and lending  - strongly  concentrated  on the need to
deregulate  labor  markets. The desire  to achieve  wage  flexibility  has led to policy  prescriptions  that2
are particularly  forceful  regarding  the limitation  of formal  wage  indexation  rules and other features
that make  the wage structure  more rigid.
In contrast to the conventional  view that wage rigidities are exogenously  imposed, the
alternative  efficiency  wage  theories  suggests  that  observed  wage  rigidities  are endogenous  to a firm's
own optimizing  behavior. These theories  postulate  that, in the absence  of mictoeconomic  policies
that alter the efficiency  wage frontier, the level of real average wages  and the pattern of wage
differentials  across sectors will not be affected  by macroeconomic  structural adjustment  policies
except  after a period of high and prolonged  unemployment  as firms  will be reluctant  to reduce  real
wages  because  of the adverse  effects  on labor  productivity  and, hence,  profits. Thus, in the presence
of efficiency  wages, the removal  of exogenotasly  imposed  labor market  distortions  will do little to
promote  wage  flexibility  and, hence,  labor  mobility  and structural  adjustment. Whether  the removal
of exogenously  imposed  labor  market  distortions  is sufficient  to provide  the required  wageflexibility
Is a fundamental  policy issues  that remains  to be resolved.
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on efficiency  wages.  The
implications  of  this  literature for macroeconomic  adjustment in  the developing countries is
highlighted. The structure  of this paper is the following: in section II we briefly describe  the
general  tenets  of efficiency  wage  theories. In Section  III we analyze  some  of the policy  implications
of efficiency  wages  for macroeconomic  adjustment  in developing  countries. Section  IV suggests
some possible  implications for  human resource development.  Section  V  reviews the
microfoundations  of this approach  while  section  VI discusses  the empirical  literature  on the subject,
pointing  out the lack  of applied  research  aimed  at a positive,  comprehensive  test of the theory. The
paper closes  with a summary  presented  in Section  VII.3
H. EFFICIENCY WAGE  THEORJES 2
Efficiency  wage  models  of unemployment  are a family  of conceptually  distinct  theories  that,
for the most part, seek to offer an explanation  of persistent  real wage  rigidities  in the presence  of
the involuntary  unemployment  observed  in most  economies.  The  central  assumption  of these  theories
is that higher real wages  can, through  various  mechanisms,  result in higher labor  productivity. A
major implication  of these tieories is that wages, and hence, labor markets,  may be unresponsive
to typical  macroeconomic  policies  which  seek to lower real wages, change  resource  allocation  and
reduce  open unemployment.
A common  tenet in all efficiency  wage theories is their focus on the firm's production
function. As in standard  microeconomic  models, the quantity  of output (Q) that a firm produces
depends  upon the amount  of labor  measured  in efficiency  units(L), capital  (K) and other inputs  (I)
it employs:
(1)  Q = F( L  K, I)
Unlike  the standard  microeconomic  model,  however,  the labor  input  in the efficiency  wage  approach
is not simply  the physical  number  of workers  employed  (N) but rather a more complex  aggregate
that also depends  on some  notion  of worker efficiency  or effort (c). Formally,  the efficiency  units
of labor can be written  as
(2)  L  = L(W, A
where  the number  of workers  hired  and  the wage  rate  paid  by the firm (W)  will determine  the impact
of labor on output.4
In determining  the contribution  of its labor input, the firm  must not only be concerned  with
the number  of workers  it has hired  (N), but also  with the level  of effort that  those  workers  put forth.
In most expositions  on efficiency  wage  theories,  the effort level  of workers  (labor  efficiency  units)
is assumed  to increase  either with the higher  wage relative  to some  average  wage  or with the real
wage in terms of consumer prices 3 . Thus,  both the number of workers hired and the wage rate paid
to those  workers  will determine  the impact  of labor  on output. This labor aggregate  is often  given
the following  functional  form
(3)  L  = e(W, y)  N
where  E(W,-y)  can be viewed  as the function  determining  the effort  level  of the workers. This labor
efficiency  function  is assumed  to be increasing  in W (6eI5W  ae.  >0).  The other variable, y, is
a vector  of parameters,  such as, taxes and subsidies,  that may  also affect  the efficiency  function.
In the standard  competitive  theory of the labor market,  the wage  rate is constantly  adjusted
to equate  aggregate  labor supply  and demand. The individual  firm takes  the market  clearing  wage
as exogenously  given.  That is, the firm is a price taker in the labor market. The optimal  pricing
decision  by the firm is to equate the value  of a worker's marginal  product  to that given wage  rate
(the marginal  value  of a worker's leisure). Changes  in labor  demand  as a result  of macroeconomic
shocks  or policies will result in both wage and employment  fluctuations. Unemployment  in this
paradigm  is voluntary  in the sense that, at the going market  wage, anybody  who wishes  to forgo
leisure  can find  employment 4. It is clear  that this model's  depiction  of flexible  wages  and voluntary
unemployment  is too simplistic  a description  of observed  wage  and employment  patterns. Further,
this model is, in many ways, unrealistic  regarding  the actual dynamics  of the wage/employment
adjustment.5
To add realism,  earlier models  attempted  to address the lack of adjustment  of wages and
labor  mobility  by asserting  that real  wages  are rigid  and fixed  above  the market  clearing  equilibrium
level. Union  and government  intervention  has been  considered  the basic force  which  prevent  wages
from clearing  the  labor market. Under  the assumption  of rigid wages,  unemployment  is involuntary
and, of course, inefficient. These  models,  however,  have been  heavily  criticized  for their inability
to explain  and rationally  justify the mechanism  that kept  wages  rigid. There is little  to explain  why
workers  seeking  employment  should  not be able to find a job by offering  to work at a lower  wage.
In efficiency  wage models,  given  the positive relationship  between  wages  and productivity
(the efficiency  function),  firmns  will no longer view the wage  rate as an exogenous  parameter,  but
rather will choose  an optimal  wage as a result of their profit maximizing  behavior.  Given that a
higher wage  will produce  higher labor  productivity,  different  wage  rates  will, for the samne  physical
amount  of labor, purchase  different  amounts  of labor  efficiency. The optimal  behavior  of the firm
is to choose  a wage  that minimizes  the average  cost  per unit of efficiency  labor not  per physical  unit
of labor as in the standard  theory. This part of the firms  problem  can be formally  written  as
(4)  Min  W
w  (W, y)
Assuming  the firm  does not face  a binding  labor  supply  constraint,  the first order conditions  for this
problem is
5e(W,  y)  - W E, 1 W,  y)
(S)  = O
'E(W,  Y)26
Rearranging,  the first order condition  can be written  as
(6)  W Cp4W, y)  X
e(W, y)
which  can be solved  for the optimal  efficiency  wage  (W).  This first order condition  gives  the well
known  "Solow"  result  that, at the optimal  wage, the elasticity  of effort with respect  to the efficiency
wage  is unity.
Once the firm has determined  that "efficiency"  wage rate, they will hire as many workers
and other inputs  required  to produce  the optimal,  profit maximizing  level of output.  This second
stage  of the firm's optimization  problem  can be written as
(7)  Max  P F(e(W,  y)N, K,  1)  - WN  - rK - ql,
where  the first order conditions  to this problem  are simply
(8)  PNE(W,  y)  - W  =  0
PfR  - r  =  0
Pf,-q  =  0
As usual, the firm's optimal  strategy  is to employ  inputs  until  their marginal  product  is equal  to the
real  input price5.
Remarkably,  the determination  of the efficiency  wage  depends  only on the characteristics  of
the efficiency  function  and not on the demand  or supply  conditions  in the market. Further,  if at the
optimal  efficiency  wage labor supply exceeds labor demand there will be persistent involuntary7
unemployment. If an unemployed  worker should  offer to work for less than  the efflciency  wage,
his offer of employment  would  be refused. This behavior  on the part of the firm is optimal. Since
labor  efficiency  is tied  to the  wage  rate, a fall in the  wage  rate  would  reduce  worker  productivity  and
hence  the profit rate of the firm. Under  the assumption  of perfect  competition  in the output  market,
at the optimal  efficiency  wage the firm is just breaking  even by employing  the marginal  worker.
Thus, at a lower wage  the firm would,  paradoxically,  be making  a loss.
To summarize,  under  the efficiency  wage  hypothesis,  the optimizing  behavior  of the firm  can
be viewed  as a two stage optimization  problem. In the first stage, the firm chooses  a wage  that
minimizes  the average cost of an efficiency  unit of labor.  The second stage of  the firm's
optimization  problem  consists  of choosing  the profit  maximizing  level  of inputs  given  the efficiency
wage, output prices and other input  prices.  An important  implication  is that firms will react to
macroeconomics  shocks  by altering  employment,  not wages.8
III.  THE LABOR  MARKET AND MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT
The basic efriciency wage theory examined in the previous section, has three central
macroeconomic  implications:  first, there is an equilibrium  "natural"  level of open unemployment,
which differs among  labor force groups and cannot  be affected  by demand management  policies;
second,  wnen reducing  the level of production  -- and to the extent that other firm's wages are
perceived  as given -- the typical firm will resort tc laying  off labor instead of reducing  wages,
thereby introducing  a significant  wage inertia and an overshooting  of open unemployment';  and
third, wages  do not respond  to clear the labor market, and are not responsive  to macroeconomic
policies  and microeconomic  deregulation.  As discussed  below, these  implications  are of paramount
importance  in the context  of macroeconomic  adjustment  policies.
The likely presence of real wage rigidity raises fundamental  questions regarding the
effectiveness  of macroeconomic  policies  and the extent to which the supply  response  needed for
adjustment  will be forthcoming.  The conventional  view assumes  that macroeconomic  policies  -- such
as those  emphasizing  demand  restrictions  via fiscal  and/or monetary  policies  to control  inflation  or
exchange  rate policies  aimed at raising  the relative  price of traded goods -- reduce  nominal  wage
increases  and  thereby  lowering  real wages. The reduction  of real  wages  involves  both an absorption
component  -- aimed  at reducing  the real domestic  aggregate  demand--  and a switching  component  -
- intended  to change  relative  wages  between  traded  goods  and non-traded  goods  to achieve  a higher
inter-industry  labor mobilitv and a subsequent  restructuring  of production. These policies  rely
heavily  on the "transitory"  nature  of the increased unemployment  induced  in order to "discipline"
the labor market.
Real  wage  flexibility  is a necessary  condition  to attain  macroeconomic  adjustment. Although9
often complicated  by labor market regulations,  the labor reallocation  between tradable and non-
zradable  industries  is the fundamental  ingredient  to achieve  structural  adjustment. 7 For reallocation
to take place, wages in terms of traded goods -- and real consumption  wages -- must decline in
response  to a nominal  devaluation. If tie price of non-traded  goods remains  unaffected  due to the
use of appropriate  absorption-reducing  policies  (restrictive  fiscal  and monetary  policies),  the relative
real production  wage  of traded  goods versus  non-traded  goods  will decline. Because  of the change
in relative  prices, labor will flow from the non-tradable  to the tradable  industry  and thereby allow
production  of traded goods to increase  relative  to non-traded  goods. If wages  are relatively  rigid,
chances  are that the process of labor reallocation  will not take place and the economy  will be
dominated  only by the recessionary  shock associated  with the mix of expenditure  reducing  and
expenditure  switching  policies.
The presence  of formal mechanisms  of wage indexation  has been usually  mentioned  as a
deterrent  of the wage flexibility  needed  for structural  adjustment.'  In particular,  the dynamic  role
of minimum  wages in pushing  the entire  wage structure  (and inflation)  up has been  pointed  out as
a crucial  mechanism  creating  wage rigidity in developing  countries 9. The implications  from the
viewpoint  of policy making  are straightforward:  institutions  and regulations  whicl, introduce  wage
rigidity in the economy  must be eliminated.
Contrary  to this conventional  view, if real  wages  are rigid due to the role played  by factors
endogenous  to the firm, such as the existence  of efficiency  wages, then the success  of demand
policies  in achieving  stabilization  and adjustment  will depend  on the stability  of the efficiency  wage
frontier  underlying  the process  of wage  determination.  The efficiency  wage  frontier  is nothing  more
than the positive relationship  between  wages and labor productivity  (effort) derived from utility
maximization  on the part of the workers.  If this frontier is very stable then it is likely  that the10
increased  uncmployment  caused  by demand restricting  policies  will have a much more moderate
effect  on real wages. Changes  in demand  and unemployment  associated  with structural  adjustment
are likely  to exert very little  effect  on the efficiency  wage  frontier  and, hence,  on the "optimal"  real
wage  as determined  by firms. If firms  are not willing  to reduce  real wages  because  of the implied
drop in labor productivity,  taxation  and subsidization  policies  aimed at affecting  worker behavior
would  be the most advisable  policies.
The stability  of the efficiency  wage  frontier  is a crucial  aspect  of the policy  implications  of
the  theory.  The basic element determining  the degree of  wage flexibility in response to
macroeconomic  adjustment  policies is the extent to  which a  consistent and invariant causal
relationship  between  wages  and  effort  prevails. If this relationship  is stable,  then  the efficiency  wage
hypothesis  has important  policy  implications;  conventional  macroeconomic  adjustment  policies  will
need  to be complemented  with microeconomic  policies  (i.e. taxation,  subsidization,  etc.) to assure
the success  of the adjustment  policies  (in  terms  of wage  flexibility and supply  response)  without  the
creation  of high and persistent  unemployment.  If on the contrary,  this stability  is rather limited,  any
policy  implications  will basically  depend  upon  the dynamics  of the forces  driving  the changes  in the
efficiency  wages  relationship.
The efficiency  wage  framework  provides  important  insights  for some  observed  labor  market
phenomena. For instance, this approach  implies that the equilibrium  wage is compatible  with
equilibrium  involuntary  unemployment  associated  to the wage premium  paid by firms.'"  In fact,
a standard  result of efficiency  wage  models  is that the equilibrium  level of wages  may  exceed the
"competitive"  wage (the wage  that  equates  labor  supply  and demand). Moreover,  in the context  of
efficiency  wage  models  (articularly the adverse  selection  theory  discussed  below),  workers  offering
services  at a lower  wage  rate are unable  to drive  the wage  down  and to expand  employment". The11
firm's profit maximizing  wage may  exceed the opportunity  cost of redundant  labor, but lowering
wages  would  entail  a greater  loss  associated  to the reduction  of productivity  and the "average  quality"
of workers  than  would  be gained  from the reduction  of per-worker  wst.
The empirical  testing  of the efficiency  wage theory is crucial  to further assess its policy
implications.  The macroeconomic  consequences  of efflciency  wages  have  to be a crucial  aspect  of
the empirical  analysis. As discussed  below,  empirical  studies  until  now  have  only provided  indirect
tests on the relevance  of the theory.  In general, no application  has been done to the case of
developing  countries. The need  for a more structural  test stands  out, which  could  be based  on the
major macroeconomic  implications  of the theory.
Given the positive effects that structural adjustment  potentially  has for future growth
prospects and the  role efficiency wages have in  achieving  this adjustment, there are  three
fundamental  macroeconomic  implications  important  to an empirical  evaluation  of the validity  of
efficiency  wages in developing  countries.  First, observed  wage changes  will not depend  upon the
level of unemployment,  although  it can be explained  by the rate of change in unemployment.
Second,  wages  are responsive  to changes  in the consumer  prices  but not to the price of the output
produced  by the firm.  Third, employmen;  levels  do not respond  to the real price of other inputs,
but only real labor compensation.
The application  of efficiency  wage theories  to developing  countries  faces the problem of
segmentation.  As  we shall  discuss,  the standard  empirical  analysis  based  on wage  differentials,  does
not usually  account  for the structural  characteristics  of the labor market, which  is in turn a factor
affecting  wage setting at firm level.  However,  efficiency  wages can be aa explanation  for the
existence  of dual  labor  markets  (segmentation  between,  for example,  a formal  sector  where  efficiency
wages  prevail  and a neoclassical  informal  sector)" 2, thus settling  a clear challenge  for designing  any12
empirical  test. Other  problems  involved  in designing  an empirical  test  on the  efficiency  wages  theory
for developing  countries  is that it cannot be simply  extended  to the informal sector, which is
characterized  by the presence  of quasi-voluntary  ("wait")  unemployment" 3. However,  in following
other empirical studies on the observed wage performance  in developing  countries, the role of
efficiency  wages  is consistent  with the relative  wage rigidity  of formal  sector labor  costs" 4
The concept  of wages  which is relevant  to empirically  analyze  the likely  important  role of
efficiency  wages  in developing  countries  constitutes  a crucial  issue. The presence  of wage  rigidity
in the formal  sector,  which  is usually  associated  to either  the presence  of endogenous  or exogenously
created  indexation,  has not  been  substantiated,  Studies  which  have  concluded  that  severe  drop  in real
wages  has taken  place in developing  countries  ought  to be examined  with care. First, an important
problem is whether  the observed  flexibility  in wages  refers to average  wages  or to some specific
sector or industry.  In fact, wages can be very flexible in the aggregate  if, for instance,  some
informal  activities  or government  wages  are included,  but still rigid in the formal  sector  producing
tradable  goods. Second,  the presence  of wage  rigidity  is an issue  that involves  relative  wages. For
instance,  wages  may  drop in both the tradable  and the non-tradable  sector, but the relative  decline
may  not be sufficient  to produce  substantial  labor  mobility. Third, wages  are most likely  irrelevant
indicators  when  examining  the issue of rigidity versus  flexibility,  as compensating  changes  in non-
wage labor costs can introduce  substantial  rigidity in total labor costs  --  the relevant  variable  when
analyzing  employment  and production  decisions.13
IV.  EFFICIENCY WAGES AND HUMAN  RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT
The efficiency  wage hypothesis  also has some important  implications  for human  resource
development. For the purposes  of this analysis,  the latter  concept  is made  equivalent  to increments
to human  capital. Adequate  investment  in human  capital,  through  either schooling  or general and
specific formal training, is among the necessary  conditions  for sustainable  long term economy
growth. As noted  earlier, in the efficiency  wage  paradigm  output  is dependent  not only  on physical
amounts  of capital  and labor, but also on worker effort or quality. Given that the investment  in
education  and  training  is the  primary  means  by which  workers  and  firms  can augment  human  capital,
efficiency  wages  theory has implications  regarding  long term economic  development.
TIis is an important,  but largely  unexplored  topic  that deserves  further  research. For now,
however,  we can only attempt  to sketch  some  of the possible  implications.  Efficiency  wages  affect
human  resource  development  directly  in two possible  ways: through  it impact  on formal  education
and through it impact on training.  As discussion in section I suggests, the higher level of
unemployment  implied  by efficiency  wages may result in a reduction  in expected  labor earnings,
particularly  for skilled  workers  in the formal  sector. Therefore,  one would  expect  a decline  in the
average  rate of return to investments  in schooling  on the part of these  workers. Moreover,  insofar
as some  of the unemployed  formal  sector  workers  may  seek  employment  in the informal  sector,  thus
driving  wages  in that sector  down, the expected  earnings  in the informal  sector  may also be lower.
Lower  expected  earnings  is important  for human  resource  development  because  it implies  an overall
decline  in the private rate of return and in the investments  in educations. Again, this impact  may
be more  important  for higher  education  than  for primary  education  since  it is mainly  the skilled  work
force that is affected by efficiency  wage unemployment. The policy implication  is that large14
government  subsidy  to education  in general, and higher education  in particular, may be needed.
Efficiency  wages, as explained in section IV under the turnover model, by raising the
opportunity  cost of  leisure and by making existing efficiency wage jobs  more attractive than
alternative  employment,  may  result  in a lower  labor  turnover  in efficiency  wage  firms. Firms,  faced
with a more stable  work force, may  be willing  to invest  more resources  in general training. The
standard  human  capital  theory predicts  that general  training  would  financed  by workers, instead  of
firms, given  that it raises the labor productivity  in the firm and  elsewhere. With lower  turnover  the
firm's would  have a longer pay back period  and it is less likely  that worker will acquire  skills  and
then  seek employment  elsewhere. In addition,  workers  may be willing  to pay more of the training
costs especially  with regards to specific  training.  This implies  that there may be less need for
govermnent  subsidies  for general  training. In sum, efficiency  wages  may imply  the possibility  for
the government  to shift resources  from general  training  to education.15
V.  MICROFOUNDATIONS  OF EFFICIENCY  WAGES
This section presents a summary review of  the five main different type of theories that
provide the  microfoundations of  efficiency wages' 5 By pinpointing alternative aspects of  the
employment  decision at the level of the firm, these theories aim at providing a rationale for the basic
postulate that higher wages do convey higher productivity implying that the wage is not given to the
firm by the prevailing labor market equilibrium.
Nutritional Theories
The first approach to incorporate  efficiency wage behavior is known as the nutritional model.
It basically emphasized the connection  between wages, nutrition and productivity' 6. This model was
aimed primarily at explaining the link between wages and productivity for agriculture workers in
developing countries.  The central focus is the connection between higher wages and a worker's
health.  The productivity of workers, it is assumed, can be sufficiently increased by better nutrition
that the cost to the employer of the higher payment to workers is outweighed by their increased
output. This implies that workers should receive a minimum subsistence  wage to allow them to meet
their nutritiopal needs and thus be more productive.  However, in most economies, particularly in
the industrial sectors, the link between wages and worker health is not likely to be important because
wages far exceed subsistence levels.  Consequently, the nutritional model is not considered relevant
in this case and emphasis has been placed on the other links between wages and productivity.
Shirking Theories
In shirking theories of efficiency wages the basic premise is that workers can choose to work
or shirk." 7 If they shirk, there is some chance that they will be caught and immediately fired.  If
there is no unemployment (above and beyond structural or natural unemployment) and all workers16
are paid the ongoing market wage, there is no cost to shirking. If a worker gets fired, he/she can
easily find another job at the same wage.  To increase the cost of shirking, employers pay a higher
than market wage, with the resulting unemployment acting as a disciplinary device on workers.
Hence, these models predict that increases in the wage will raise the cost of job loss, reduce shirking
and thus will raise productivity.  The optimal policy for the firm,  in  addition to  adopting an
announced policy of random monitoring and dismissal of workers found shirking, would be to pay
a wage in excess of the opportunity cost of labor (what the worker would get if he were fired).  In
the aggregate, average wages and labor productivity would rise and employment would fall.  18
Turnover Theories
This set of theories has a similar rationale but generally emphasizes the effect of wages above
the market-clearing level on the costs associated with high labor turnover.' 9 These turnover costs
generally consist of direct costs incurred in the hiring and training of new workers, as well as the
indirect cost of lost production as these new workers take some time to achieve their full potential.
Workers are less likely to quit if either the relative wage or the level of unemployment is high.  di
turnover model has been one of the most popular versions of efficiency wage theories.  In choosing
a wage, the firm faces an important tradeoff.  A lower wage will have the benefit of reducing the
total direct labor costs for the firm, but will increase turnover cost as more workers quit and have
to be replaced.  This is because the lower the firm's  wage is relative to the average wage in the
economy the higher the quit rate.  Higher levels of unemployment, however, tend to discourage
workers from quitting.  Given that high turnover is associated with the loss of firm-specific skills
and a decline in labor productivity, we once again have the prediction that a high relative wage
and/or a high level of unemployment will increase productivity.  This time, however, the benefits
to the firm result from the effects of reduced turnover costs.17
Sociological Theories
Another justification for efficiency wage behavior can be provided on what has been called
"sociological" grounds. 20 A firm may attempt to raise the effort level of its workers by paying
them a wage above what they could obtain outside the firm, on the implicit condition that workers
will reciprocate by working harder.  In this  model, workers compare their wage with what  is
regarded as a "fair wage".  The latter may depend, in similarity to other efficiency wage models,
on the outside wage and the unemployment rate.  In that case, we also have prediction that an
increase in the relative wage and/or the unemployment rate will boosts productivity at the level of
the firm.  This time, however, productivity increases by making grateful workers feel that they must
reciprocate their good treatment with higher work effort.
Adverse Selection Theories
An additional rationalization for efficiency wages is offered in terms of adverse selection. 2'
The basic argument here is that the wage rate is a signal to attract a specific type of worker, labor
is viewed as a heterogenous input differing by quality.  Therefore, firms raise wages in order to
attract a larger and  "better" pool of suitable applicants.  Hence, given that no one, except the
applicant  themselves, knows about these difference in quality, firms pay high relative wages to attract
more and better applicant and thus achieve higher levels of productivity.
Critique of Efficiency Wage Theories
The most fundamental critique to the efficiency wage approach is the bonding argument. 22
This  argument suggests that  efficiency wages are  unnecessary because firms do  use different
disciplinary devices --such as seniority wage systems and pension schemes -- based on an implicit
performance bond which is waived if the worker does not perform satisfactorily. 23 In other words,
this argument implies that the rents associated with efficiency wages are deferred to the future18
thereby forcing worker to remain with the firm and avoid shirking.  However, it has been pointed
out that explicit bonding arrangement would be difficult since imperfect capital markets would not
enable workers to obtain cash to post a bond or pay an employment fee. 24 In addition, is also
argued that the bonding system creates a moral hazard problem on the part of the firm since nothing
would prevent, once the bond is posted, the firm from cashing the bond and firing the worker on the
grounds that he/she was shirking. 2519
VI. RECENT  EMPIRICAL  WORK  ON EFFICIENCY  WAGE MODELSo
Empirical  testing  of efficiency  wages  theories  is still in its infancy.  26  To date, there have
been two distinct empirical  approaches  to the testing  of the efficiency  wage hypothesis. The first
approach explores, on  the basis of  case studies, the central relationship  between wages and
productivity.  While striking  at the heart of the efficiency  wage  hypothesis,  this approach  has yet to
be rigorously  pursued  and has yielded mostly  anecdotal  evidence. The second  approach  examines
wage  differentials  across  either  industries,  firms  and/or  occupations.  For the most  part this  empirical
research has centered on  statistically  examining the role played by  industry and labor force
characteristics  on inter-industry  wage differentials. Given that a portion of the observed wage
differentials  is systematically  left unexplained  by the economic  variables,  this residual  is attributed
to the role played  by efficiency  wages 27. Despite  the use of sophisticated  econometrics  and data
requirements,  this approach  has tended to produce only an indirect  test and is thus subject to
criticism.
Most available  empirical  studies  deal with the case  of industrial  countries. 28 These studies
have, therefore,  not  been  able to capture  the particularities  of labor  markets  in developing  countries.
In particular,  they seldom  account  for the role of segmentation,  the different  access  of firms  to the
formal  capital  markets,  and the different  coverage  of industrial  and other regulations,  that are often
found  in developing  countries. These  factors  may  be crucially  linked  to observed  wage  differentials.
Therefore,  accounting  for the industry  and labor force characteristics  may not be enough,  being
necessary  to include  the structural  characteristics  of the labor market  into the analysis.
The Case Studies  ApDroach
As noted  earlier, the positive  relationship  going  from  wages  to productivity  is at the heart of20
the efficiency  wage hypothesis. Empirical  research on this direct link, however, has been very
limited. The findings  of two  well known  case  studies  - the Stanford  Linear  Accelerator  Center  and
the Ford Motor Company  - have suggested  the existence  of efficiency  wages. 29
In 1975,  management  at  the Stanford  Linear  Accelerator  Center  indicated  that it would  reduce
its work force by 10 percent.  To avoid the layoff, workers responded  to this announcement  by
volunteering  to take a 10 percent  cut in wages. Management,  implicitly  appealing  to the adverse
selection  model  of efficiency  wages  highlighted  above, rejected  this offer on the grounds  that lower
wages  would  result in a reduction  in the quality  of the work force ("the best workers  would  quit").
The other case  study examines  the relationship  between  employee  compensation,  output and
profits  of Ford Motor Company  before and after the introduction  of the "five  dollar day" in 1914.
In January  of 1914, the working  day at Ford was decreased  from 9 to 8 hours and the minimum
daily pay was increased from $2.34 to $5.00.  Following  the pay increase, turnover declined
significantly  and productivity  is estimated  to have increased  between  30 and 70 percent.  In spite  of
a higher wage  bill, profits  at Ford continued  to increase. The study suggests  that productivity  and
profits responded  in a manner  consistent  with the efficiency  wage  hypothesis.
These  two case  studies  by themselves,  however,  are not  sufficient  evidence  of the  widespread
application  of efficiency  wages. 30 To support  the broader  claim that efficiency  wages  play a role
in macroeconomic  fluctuations,  evidence  of a wage-productivity  link in many  different  sectors  of the
economy  is needed.
iTh Statistical ADorAach
Persistent  interindustry  wage  differentials  have always  been a puzzle  to economists.
Research  on the efficiency  wage  hypothesis  has, therefore,  mainly  concentrated  on the examination
of occupational  and industrial  wage differentials. 3"  The standard  competitive  labor market model21
suggests that  persistent  industry wage  premiums can only  occur  if  there  are  industry-related
differences  in labor  quality  or other  aspects  of work  that require  compensating  differences. Further,
transitory  industry  wage  differences  may  be explained  by changes  in labor  demand  across  sectors  in
conjunction  with imperfect  labor mobility. These transitional  differences,  however,  cannot  persist
over the long run. Any  test examining  them  must be based  on longitudinal  data with sufficient  time
horizon  to account  for those transitional  differences.
Under  th  s efficiency  wage  hypothesis,  on the other  hand, if the relationship  between  wages
and productivity  (the efficiency  frontier)  differs  across  industries,  then  the optimal  wage  will differ.
This implies  that workers  with identical  characteristics  will be paid differently  depending  on their
industry affiliation.  Thus unlike the standard model, these wage differentials  reflect industry
characteristics  that do not require compensating  differentials.
So far, empirical results reached  in the standard statistical  exercises  do not support the
hypothesis  that firms are wage  takers, but rather support  some type of efficiency  wage behavior.
In the case of industrial  economies,  and after controlling  for all possible  relevant  variables  -- such
as schooling  years, seniority,  occupational  and  geographical  characteristics  -- a substantial  proportion
of wage disparities  remains unexplained. 32 More sophisticated  empirical studies have proxied
compensating  differentials  to account  for their  role in explaining  inter-industry  wage  gaps, in addition
to the other more standard  explanatory  variables.  33  They still observe  significant,  stable and
unexplained  wage differentials  across industries. Yet other empirical  studies  have used a special
cohort sample  survey  and a version  of the turnover  model  to test the explanatory  power  of standard
economic  variables, reporting the inability of the model to  compleiely  explain observed wage
differentials 34.
There are four major  conclusions  of studies  that have  used the statistical  approach  to test the22
efficiency  wage  theory. First, there exist  substantial  wage  differentials  among  industries,  even  after
correcting  for skills, age, gender,  job characteristics,  compensating  differentials,  unionization  and
other  demographic  factors. Second, the ranking  of industries  according  to wage  paid  has remained
fairly constant  throughout  long periods of time.  Third, wage differentials  throughout  industrial
branches  for several  countries  appear  to be remarkably  similar  and large wage  differentials  persist
at  various levels of  disaggregation.  Four, the degree of  unionization  or  the existence of
compensating  differentials  does not appear having a  central role in explaining  inter-industry
differentials. The existence  of unexplained  wage  differentials  is, however,  more a rejection  of the
market competition  hypothesis,  than an acceptance  of the efficiency  wages.  Nonetheless,  the
conclusions  reached  in the existing  empirical  literature  are consistent  with the predictions  of the
efficiency  wage hypothesis.
With regard to developing  countries, studies on wage differentials  have been scarce and
aimed at more general analyses  of industrial  patterns."  Studies based on wage setting  functions
have been carried out in the context of analyzing  the contribution  of general human capital to
earnings  rather than that of studying  wage differentials  along the lines of the efficiency  wage
theory. 36 There has been only one study directly applying an efficiency wage model to  a
developing  country." That study  examined  wages  in the manufacturing  sector  of Sao Paulo  finding
that  the  estimated  wage  differentials  in Brazil  were large,  statistically  significant  and  highly  correlated
with wage differentials  observed  in some of the industrial  countries. The study used a two-stage
estimation  procedure  to examine  the firm  and industry  correlates  of interfirm  wage  differentials. In
the first stage firm  level earning  functions  were estimated. In the second  stage,  predicted  firm-level
wages  for observationally  equivalent  workers  were regressed  onto firm and industry  characteristics.
The regression controlled for differences  in capital intensity  at the firm level, size, industry23
concentration,  percent multinational  and modernity  of technology.  Although  recognizing  that wage
differentials  may be partly explained  by industry  differences  in human  capital,  the study  concludes
that the strong link between firm concentration  and high wages suggests that efficiency wage
considerations  are an important  determinant  of wage  premium.
Research  at the World Bank  has touched  upon  the industrial  wage  structure  in a limited  way
and not in the direction  of examining  relative  wage  rigidity  determined  by exogenous  or endogenous
forces. An exception  is the recent Bank  study  on the modern  sector of Cote  d'Ivoire. 38 That study
found  that industrial  restructuring  and  entry  of new smaller  firms  explained  the occurrence  of a large
drop in employment  and a sharp  decline  in the rate of return to human  capital  in the Cote  d'lvoire.
The study  showed  that  wages,  in the aggregate  drop, by less  than  disaggregated  wage  data (measured
across industries). The conclusion  of the study implies  that there is relative wage rigidity in the
formal  sector of large enterprises,  supporting  the idea that adjustrnent  would require  higher labor
mobility  from large to small  firms. Along  similar  lines, two other recent  Bank  studies  have shown
that wages  in the formal  sector of four Latin American  economies  are relatively  more rigid than
those  in the informal  sector. 39 These studies  investigated  the consequences  in terms of adjustment,
and the implications  in terms of deregulation  of the labor market. In not of these studies is the
probable  origin of that relative  rigidity  in efficiency  wages  was explored.
Testing  the empirical  predictions  of the efficiency  wage  hypothesis  is still at an early stage.
The examination  of the direct link  between  wages  and productivity  is limited  to a few case studies.
The rest of the empirical work concentrates  on  industry wage differentials  and it has been
overwhelmingly  applied  to the case  of industrial  countries. These  differentials,  however,  are neither
necessary  nor sufficient  conditions  for the existence  of efficiency  wages. Wage differences  across
industries  can arise as a result  of compensating  differentials  or unobservable  specific  human  capital.24
VII. SU1MMARY
Efficiency  wages  provide  a very plausible  explanation  to several  empirical  phenomena.  The
implications  of efficiency  wages are particularly  important  for the discussion  of macroeconomic
adjustment  programs  because  the resulting  endogenous  wage  rigidity  will inhibit  the required  labor
market response, leading to a limited supply  response in the adjusting  sectors of the economy.
However, empirical testing has not yet provided a definite answer on the underlying  structural
causality. This paper has suggested  that a more structural  testing  of the hypothesis  has to be based
upon its major macroeconomic  implications  in terms of the response  of wages  to unemployment,
consumer  prices and other factor  prices.
The implications  of the efficiency  wages theory are particularly  important  for developing
countries.  Labor market segmentation  and persistent  unemployment  can be better analyzed  and
understood  through  the application  of efficiency  wages  theories  to the impact  of adjustment  policies.
This undoubtedly  calls for specific  empirical  analysis. More  particularly,  the issue  of wage  rigidity
must be addressed  more comprehensively,  including  disaggregation  across economic  sectors and
consideration  of the non-wage  cost component  of labor costs.  In general,  there is an enormous
potential  to enrich  policy  recommendations  by applying  the efficiency  wage  approach  to Developing
Countries.25
FOOTNOTES
1.  This has been, for example, the main focus of studies on the labor market in Argentina,
Colombia,  Chile,  Peru, the  Philippines  and  other  countries.  See, Lopez  (1987),  Riveros  (1990),  Cox-
Edwards  (1987), Riveros  & Sax  chez  (1987),  Suarez  (1987)  and World Bank  (1988). See also the
collection  of studies  in Mazumdar 1  (1990). For a general  review  on this issue, see Fallon &
Riveros  (1990). Formal  models  analyzing  rigidities  created  by exogenously  introduced  distortions
are presented  in Edwards  (1989).  Edwards  & Cox-Edwards  (1990)  and Lopez  & Riveros  (1990a,b).
2.  Despite  its infancy,  there are several  excellent  survey articles  written on the efficiency  wage
hypothesis. These articles  cover in greater detail  the material  present  in this section  of the paper.
See, for example,  Carmichael  (1990),  Fisher  (1989),  Katz (1986)  and Yellen  (1984).
3. The basic assumption  would  be that effort increases  according  to a non-linear  relationship.
4. Unemployment  in this approach  can also be of a transitional  nature, associated  to a sluggish  real
wage adjustment  in response  to demand  fluctuations.
5.  An alternative  approach  would  be to use a conditional  profit  function. In a first stage, the firm
maximizes  profits with respect  to all other inputs  and output  levels  conditional  on e(W,  ,)N.  In the
second  stage the firm  would  solve  the following  problem:
MaW  -1(eN  1,; .- WW  sbjec  toa e-  e(W.y)
N,W
The first  order conditions  for this  problem  can be solved  simultaneously  to arrive at the Solow  result
presented  in Equation  6.
6. The important  work of Summers  (1988),  has pointed  the existence  of this coordination  problem
associated  to the information  available  to the firm.
7. This point  has been made  by Edwards  (1988),
8.  See, for instance, Holland  (1988), Prachowny  (1980), Zandamela  (1988), Gros (1986), and
Williamson (1985).
9. See Paldam  and Riveros  (1989).
10. See Stiglitz  (1987),  Yellen  (1984),  and Solow  (1979).
11.  A model  which points out the main characteristics  of the relationship  between  insiders  and
outsiders  to the firm is presented  by Lindbeck  & Snower  (1986a, 1986b)
12. See, for example,  Jones (1985)  and Bulow  and Summers  (1986).
13. See Hall (1975),  Harberger  (1971)  and Lopez  and Riveros  (1990a).
14. Lopez  and Riveros  (1990a,  1990b).26
15. In addition  to the five theories explained  below, a sixth rationale for the efficiency  wage
approach is the 'Union Threat" model (Dickens, 1986). In this variant, high wages are paid to
prevent the formation  of militant  Unions.  Again, this model  points to the role of economic  and
institutional  factors  and its empirical  implications  are basically  the same  as the other four versions.
16. See  Leibenstein  (1957),  Mirrless  (1975), Bliss  and Stern  (1978)  and Dasgupta  and Ray (1986,
1987).
17. For a review  of analysis  of this version  see, Calvo  (1979),  Stiglitz  and Shapiro  (1984),  Bowles
(1981).  and Stoft (1982).
18.  See also Foster & Wan (1984)  who provide  an explanation  on the shirking  issue  based on the
principal  agent  problem.
19. See, for example,  Stiglitz  (1974),  and Salop  (1979).
20.  See, for example,  Akerlof  (1982).
21. See, for example,  Weiss  (1980).
22. This has been  advanced  by Lazear  (1981)
23. See Fisher (1989).
24. The argument  was originally  developed  by Shapiro  and Stiglitz. See also, Dickens,  Katz and
Lang  (1986).
25. See Fisher (1989). Carmichael  (1985)  indicates  that the moral hazard  may not be serious,  but
Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984) note that it is the seriousness  of this problem which explains why
performance  bonds are rarely observed  in the real world.
26.  In particular, no study has attempted to use a general model to positively test the main
implications  of the efficiency  wage hypothesis  as against,  for instance,  the ones derived from the
conventional  neoclassical  theory.
27. Fisher  (1989)  presents  a critical  review  of studies  that have  undertaken  a direct  evaluation  on the
existence  of a relationship  between  wages and productivity. See Raff & Summers  (1987) for a
specific  case study on labor  compensation  and introduction  of an efficiency  wage.
28. The exception,  of course, is the limited  body  of work concentrating  on the nutritional  model  of
efficiency  wages. See, for example,  Dasgupta  and Ray (1987).
29. Weiss (1980) recounts the story of the Stanford  Linear Accelerator  center without directly
appealing  to the efficiency  wage  hypothesis.  Raff  and  Summers  (1987)  studied  the Ford  case  looking
for evidence  of efficiency  wages.27
30. In contrast  to the positive  wage  productivity,  Leonard  (1987)  looks  for a negative  relationship
between  level of supervision  and wages  implied  by the shirking  approach  to efficiency  wages. He
finds  little connection  between  the two.  His result, however,  have  been criticized  because  his data
source  is not specified  and it covers  only one industry.
31.  See Dickens  and Katz, (1987, 1988),  Murphy  and Topel (1988) and Krueger  and Summers
(1988a, 1988b).
32. See Katz (1986),  Dickens  and Katz (1987), and Murphy  and Topel (1987).Raff  and Summers
have  studied  a specific  case on labor compensation  and introduction  of an efficiency  wage.
33. See, Kreuger  and Summers  (1988)
34. Beaudry  (1989). Campbell  (1989),  on the basis of an aggregate  wage setting  model, has also
studied  the hypothesis  of wage  rigidity  in France  and Canada. His findings  also support  the validity
of the efficiency  wage  hypothesis.
35. See, for instance,  the study by Salazar-Carrillo  (1982)  analyzing  the structure  of manufacturing
wages  for a sample  of Latin  American  economies,  describing  their  basic  features  with regard  to both
distribution  and explanatory  factors.
36. See Fields (1980),  Riveros  (1990), Uthoff  (1983),  and Corbo  and Stelcner  (1983).
37.  See Robbins  (1989).
38.  See Levy & Newman  (1989).
39.  See Lopez  & Riveros  (1990a,b).28
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